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Individuals from East Asian (Chinese) backgrounds have been shown to exhibit greater
sensitivity to a speaker’s perspective than Western (U.S.) participants when resolving
referentially ambiguous expressions.We show that this cultural difference does not reﬂect
better integration of social information during language processing, but rather is the
result of differential correction: in the earliest moments of referential processing, Chinese
participants showed equivalent egocentric interference to Westerners, but managed to
suppress the interference earlier andmore effectively. A time-series analysis of visual-world
eye-tracking data found that the two cultural groups diverged extremely late in processing,
between 600 and 1400 ms after the onset of egocentric interference. We suggest that
the early moments of referential processing reﬂect the operation of a universal stratum of
processing that provides rapid ambiguity resolution at the cost of accuracy and ﬂexibility.
Late components, in contrast, reﬂect the mapping of outputs from referential processes
to decision-making and action planning systems, allowing for a ﬂexibility in responding that
is molded by culturally speciﬁc demands.
Keywords: perspective taking, comprehension, cultural differences, ambiguity, reference
INTRODUCTION
The human language comprehension system is shaped by infor-
mational demands related to communication that are relatively
universal, as well as by demands of a more social nature that can
vary widely across cultures. On the universal side, spoken language
is inherently ambiguous at multiple levels, from lexical processing
all the way up to the identiﬁcation of speech acts and resolution
of referential ambiguity. In addition, the speech signal itself is
evanescent, requiring language comprehenders to rapidly commit
to speciﬁc parsing decisions and interpretations. On the culturally
speciﬁc side, cultures vary in the underlying norms and values that
regulate social behavior, including norms for participation in con-
versational interaction. Do the cultural norms governing language
and social interaction impact language processing as immediately
and as powerfully as the universal demands for rapid ambiguity
resolution? Or do they mainly determine how outputs from rel-
atively universal processes are mapped onto later decisions and
actions?
One way of addressing these general questions is to com-
pare language users from different cultures in terms of how they
integrate social and linguistic information during the online pro-
cessing of referring expressions. In this study, we investigated
cultural differences in how Chinese vs. Western (U.S.) language
users take into account a speaker’s diverging perspective when
they resolve ambiguous references such as the candle. Referring
expressions are of theoretical interest not only because they are
ubiquitous in conversation, but also because they require listen-
ers to go beyond the input – an expression such as the candle
denotes a particular class of object, not any particular individual
object, and so listeners must access further information to deter-
mine which candle is being spoken about. When speakers and
listeners have different visual perspectives, reference resolution
will only be consistently successful if listeners take these differ-
ences into account. It is also methodologically convenient to study
visual perspective taking during reference resolution, because a
listener’s eye gaze during the search for a referent provides an
external index of the moment-by-moment process of language
interpretation (Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). The wax-
ing and waning of referential alternatives during processing will
be reﬂected in moment-by-moment changes in the probability
distribution of eye gaze over these alternatives.
Studies of perspective taking during reference resolution have
experimentally created differences in perspective between speak-
ers and listeners, and monitored listeners’ interpretations as they
interpret speakers’ instructions tomanipulate objects (Keysar et al.,
2000; Nadig and Sedivy, 2002; Hanna et al., 2003). These studies
suggest that listeners momentarily experience egocentric interfer-
ence, with listeners considering “privileged” information that they
know is unavailable to the speaker. For example, when searching
for a referent for the expression the candle, listeners will temporar-
ily consider a candle that is hidden from the speaker’s view, in
spite of their knowledge that the speaker does not know about
it and therefore could only be referring to another, mutually vis-
ible candle (Keysar et al., 2000, 2003). Ultimately, listeners tend
to eventually choose the mutually visible candle, although some-
times they may exhibit signs of confusion. For example, listeners
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frequently ask the speaker to clarify the reference, even though
if they took the speaker’s point of view, they would realize the
reference was perfectly clear.
Although the basic phenomenon of egocentric interference has
been replicated in numerous studies, recent evidence suggests that
it might be speciﬁc to the Western (European and North Amer-
ican) populations that have been the traditional object of study
(Wu and Keysar, 2007). Cultures differ in the extent to which
they emphasize the thoughts and beliefs of the individual versus
those of the larger group, with cultures of East Asia exhibiting a
more “collectivist” character relative to Western cultures, which
tend to be more “individualist” in nature (Triandis et al., 1988;
Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Ross et al., 2002). Lifelong member-
ship in a particular culture may shape one’s tendency or ability to
take another’s perspective into account while comprehending lan-
guage. If so, thenpeople fromEastAsianbackgrounds should show
more reliable and effective perspective taking than Westerners in
resolving references.
To test this prediction, Wu and Keysar (2007) conducted an
eye-tracking study using the basic visual perspective-taking task
of Keysar et al. (2000), comparing the performance of Mandarin-
speaking Chinese to English-speaking North Americans (from
the U.S.). Each group performed the task in its participants’
native language. Participants played the role of “listener,” sit-
ting across a table from a confederate “director,” with a set of
shelves placed between them. The contents of some of the shelves
were visible from both sides, while others were hidden from the
speaker’s view. The director had a picture of how the objects
in the shelves should be arranged, and told the listener which
objects to move and where to move them. Embedded within the
interaction were certain pre-scripted test instructions designed
to be ambiguous from the listener’s perspective, in that they
could refer either to a mutually visible “target” object, or a priv-
ileged “competitor” object that was visible only to the listener.
For example, in one such instruction the director told the listener
to “move the candle to the top row,” in a context where the lis-
tener saw two identical candles, only one of which was visible
to the speaker. Listeners’ eyes were tracked as they interpreted
these test instructions. To provide a baseline, in a control condi-
tion, the competitor object was replaced with a non-competitor
(an object that did not match the description of the target, such
as a toy truck for the “candle” instruction). Egocentric inter-
ference would lead to an elevated probability of looking at the
hidden competitor (candle) relative to the hidden non-competitor
(toy truck), as well as in a delayed latency to ﬁxate on the
competitor.
Wu and Keysar (2007) found that while Western participants
showed the typical pattern of strong egocentric interference, Chi-
nese participants showed virtually no interference. Unlike their
American counterparts, Chinese participants were far less likely to
ﬁxate on privileged objects or to ask the speaker to clarify a refer-
ence that was ambiguous from their own perspective. In short, the
Chinese participants were much more effective overall at taking
the speaker’s perspective into account.
How might these cultural differences be explained in terms
of underlying cognitive processing? Wu and Keysar (2007) mea-
sured egocentric interference in terms of ﬁrst ﬁxation latency and
ﬁxation duration, measures that can detect overall differences
between groups, but that do not provide information about when
such differences might emerge. To gain further insight into the
underlying processes, we reanalyzed the data fromWu and Keysar
(2007) using a more time-sensitive analysis in order to investigate
the time-course of these cultural differences. Our analysis sought
to test whether cultural differences emerged early or late relative
to the onset of referential processing. On the one hand, cultural
differences in egocentric interferencemay be present from the ear-
liest moments of referential processing, suggesting that Chinese
are able to more effectively use information about perspective to
constrain the online processing of referring expression. On the
other hand, it is possible that cultural differences emerge late,
with both groups showing similar levels of egocentric interference
early on, and only diverging later. This latter pattern would imply
that the earliest moments of processing are unaffected by social
information, and are driven largely by egocentric heuristics that
enable rapid ambiguity resolution. Under this view, cultural dif-
ferences would emerge late because participants from a Chinese
background would be faster and more effective than Westerners
at suppressing the pragmatically inappropriate information. In
other words, cultural differences would not reﬂect differences in
the ability to integrate social information into language process-
ing, but instead would reﬂect differences in how listeners connect
the outcome of basic referential processes to further thought and
action.
Having laid out these possibilities in general terms, let us now
consider inmore detail the nature of the analysis, the possible out-
comes, and their implications for theories of language processing
and social cognition. Our analysis focused on the temporal pro-
ﬁle of egocentric interference across the two cultural groups. We
deﬁne egocentric interference as the difference in the likelihood
of gazing at a hidden competitor (e.g., candle) versus gazing at
a hidden non-competitor (e.g., toy truck). Note that we expect
interference to show a curvilinear effect over time as shown by the
curves in Figure 1, climbing from zero up to a peak from which
it will eventually drop (as the listener will ultimately ignore the
competitor and select the target).
Based on previous literature, we identify three different effect
proﬁles that would be consistent with three different theoretical
accounts. The ﬁrst account, which we term the differential inte-
gration account, assumes that the cultural difference reﬂects the
enhanced ability of Chinese to integrate information about the
speaker’s perspective with incoming linguistic information. This
account would be consistent with constraint-based models of per-
spective use in language comprehension (Nadig and Sedivy, 2002;
Hanna et al., 2003), as thesemodels assume that information about
a speaker’s perspective is one of many cues that are simultane-
ously and interactively integrated during processing. Critically,
the account does not differentiate between different types of cues,
assuming that any available cue can inﬂuence any level of pro-
cessing from its earliest moments, regardless of its source (e.g.,
whether it is derived from the unfolding syntax or semantics of the
utterance or from situational pragmatics); the inﬂuence of a given
cue depends only on its salience and reliability. Under this view,
the shared perspective between the speaker and listener is a more
salient and reliable cue for Chinese than for Westerners. Thus,
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FIGURE 1 | Predictions of differential integration (A), differential correction (B), and differential integration plus correction (C).
Chinese should show less egocentric interference than Western-
ers from the earliest moments of referential processing – in other
words, the onset of the cultural difference should be simultane-
ous with the onset of the overall effect of egocentric interference
(Figure 1A).
An alternative possibility is suggested by the autonomous acti-
vation hypothesis of Barr (2008) which, in contrast to constraint-
based accounts, assumes that information about a speaker’s
perspective is a kind of situational cue that inﬂuences compre-
hension through anticipatory or post-lexical decision processing,
but is not integrated into online lexical processing. Anticipa-
tory processing refers to those steps taken by the listener in
preparation for a referring expression, such as increasing atten-
tion to shared (mutually visible) objects. Barr (2008) found that
comprehenders strongly anticipated that speakers would refer to
referential candidates that were shared with the speaker, as evi-
denced by a higher probability of ﬁxating shared than privileged
objects. However, supporting autonomous activation, while inter-
preting the referring expression, listeners did not show any less
interference from privileged than from shared competitors: the
probability of gazing at a privileged competitor increased from
its (lower) baseline at the same rate as the increase in prob-
ability for a shared competitor. Strikingly, in one experiment
Barr (2008) found that unlike information about the speaker’s
perspective, listeners could very efﬁciently integrate contextual
constraints derived from verb semantics. Based on these ﬁnd-
ings, Barr (2008) argued that lexical processing is encapsulated
from high-level information about a speaker’s perspective, and
perhaps from other kinds of situational information, but is not
strictly modular in the sense of being completely cognitively
impenetrable.
The autonomous activation account would predict that Chi-
nese participants might be more sensitive overall to a speaker’s
perspective, but without showing any greater ability to integrate
this information with the linguistic input. Under this view, they
should experience comparable levels of egocentric interference to
Westerners, at least during the earliest moments of comprehen-
sion. In the current paradigm, this difference would be expressed
as differential correction: Chinese participants would not initially
experience less egocentric interference, but would be faster and
more effective at suppressing this interference than Westerners
(Figure 1B)1. Of course, the integration and correction accounts
are not mutually exclusive. A third possibility would be that the
groups differ in both integration and correction, such that not
only do Chinese participants experience lower interference from
the earliest moments of comprehension, but they also are more
efﬁcient at suppressing this interference (Figure 1C). This pattern
would be consistent with constraint-based models.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Additional details regarding experimental and data collection
procedures are available in the original report (Wu and Keysar,
2007).
Our analyses considered looks to the competitor/non-
competitor object from 250 ms after the onset of the critical word
(e.g., the word “candle” in the phrase “move the candle. . .”) until
3000 ms. Observations for a given trial were terminated when lis-
teners touched the target. These points varied from trial to trial,
with a median of 3306 ms (2808 vs. 3844 for Chinese vs. U.S. par-
ticipants, respectively), and a standard deviation of 4729 ms. For
those trials that were terminated before 3000 ms, we replaced the
missing frames with 0 s (representing the absence of a look to the
competitor/non-competitor object).
Our goal was to test whether there was a time-lag between
the onset of egocentric interference and the onset of cultural
differences. To give an overview of our analysis method, we
applied the cluster randomization method that has become pop-
ular in neuroimaging for determining the spatial and temporal
extent of experimentally induced effects (Bullmore et al., 1999;
Maris and Oostenveld, 2007; for prior adaptation of the solu-
tion to the analysis of visual-world data, see Barr et al., 2013). This
approach is attractive for localizing effects in time in a visual-world
study because it takes advantage of temporal correlations among
adjacent data points to overcome the problemof multiple compar-
isons. The approach proceeds as follows. First, a signiﬁcance test
is performed at each time slice for a given effect (e.g., main effect
1Unlike Barr (2008), the current study does not offer the possibility of determining
whether listeners were attentionally biased toward shared referential alternatives
before hearing the referring expression. This would require additional conditions
in which the competitor or non-competitor would be shared with the speaker.
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or interaction). Then, “clusters” are deﬁned by identifying adja-
cent time slices where the effect reaches signiﬁcance, and where all
effects are in the same direction. For example, consider tests per-
formed at six subsequent time slices, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, and t6, with
tests signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level only at t2, t3, t5, and t6. If t2 and
t3 have effects in the same direction, then they form a cluster; like-
wise, if t5 and t6 are in the same direction, they also form a cluster.
There are two separate clusters rather than a single one because of
the intervening non-signiﬁcant test at t4. Once the clusters have
been identiﬁed, a “cluster mass statistic” is calculated for each one,
typically the sumof all of the individual test statistics (e.g., t values)
for that cluster. One obtains a null-hypothesis distribution for this
cluster mass statistic through randomization (permutation tests);
i.e., by randomly shufﬂing the condition labels across trials to cre-
ate a large number of new datasets, repeating the above procedure
on these datasets, and then storing the maximum obtained cluster
mass statistic for each one. Finding a signiﬁcant cluster between ti
and tj with, say, 1000 additional randomizeddatasets andp= 0.002
means that the cluster mass statistic for the original data was
matched or exceeded in only 2 of the 1000 randomly created
datasets.
We did this procedure twice, once to test for the main effect
of Competition (competitor vs. non-competitor, e.g., egocentric
interference), and once to test for the Culture-by-Competition
interaction. The cluster randomization procedure provides only
p-values; however, we were also interested in deﬁning conﬁdence
limits for our effects. To obtain these conﬁdence limits we used
bootstrapping (details below). The remainder of this section pro-
vide further technical details regarding how these analyses were
implemented.
Rather than comparing the observed probabilities at each time
point, we ﬁt a time-series model to the data and compared
predictions from the model, following Barr et al. (2013). The
time-series model smooths the data over time, thus minimizing
noise and facilitating the detection of clusters (see Figure 2B).
In the model, time was represented as a 7th order polynomial.
We determined the order of the polynomial using a model search
procedure, in which we calculated the Akaike Information Cri-
terion (AIC) value for all models ranging from a 3rd order to a
16th order polynomial, and then selected the model with the low-
est AIC, which was a 7th order polynomial. This was done on
the grand-averaged data (i.e., without any predictors for Com-
petition or Culture) so as not to bias the cluster randomization
procedure.
Logistic regression models were ﬁt to the data using the multi-
nom() procedure of the nnet package (Venables and Ripley, 2002)
of R statistical software (R Core Team, 2013), treating the outcome
for each sample as binary. The cluster randomization procedure
was performed twice, once treating subjects as random and items
as ﬁxed (p1), and once treating items as random and subjects
as ﬁxed (p2). For simplicity, we describe the procedure treating
subjects as random factors. In addition to the parameter esti-
mates from a ﬁt to the original data, we created 999 additional
data sets by randomly permuting the condition labels (competi-
tor vs. control) independently for each unit (subject or item). To
obtain orthogonality between the main effects and the interac-
tion, the relabeling followed a “synchronized” permutation logic
(Pesarin, 2001). For a given culture group, a permutation was cre-
ated by randomly choosing, with equal probability, whether or
not to block-exchange all competitor and non-competitor labels
for each subject. The same number of exchanges was then per-
formed for the other culture group (with the units undergoing the
exchange chosen at random). The “synchronization” of exchanges
across groups (i.e., ensuring that the same number of exchanges
of Competition occurs at each of the two levels of Group) ensures
that the tests for the main effects and interaction are orthogonal
(Pesarin, 2001). The parameter estimates for the model ﬁt to each
of these data sets were stored as a row in the matrix.
After all datasets were created, we then calculated the predicted
log odds of a gaze to the competitor/non-competitor object at
each 1/60 of a second (i.e., for each frame of data sampled at
60 Hz), deriving main effects and interactions at each time point.
The predicted effects for each of the 1000 datasets (including the
original) were stored as separate rows in a matrix. The p-value
for each effect (main effect of competition or interaction) at each
time point was given as the number of rows in the effect matrix
exceeding the original value divided by the number of rows in
the matrix. Then, we identiﬁed clusters by grouping together all
temporally adjacent time-frames where the effect reached signiﬁ-
cance. A clustermass statistic (Bullmore et al., 1999)was calculated
for each cluster by summing together the negative (natural) log-
arithm of each p-value belonging to the cluster, such that smaller
p-values would contribute to a larger cluster mass statistic; for
example, for 0.05 the negative log is 3, and for 0.0001 it is 9.21.
This cluster mass statistic was calculated for each cluster in the
original data. Then, a null-hypothesis distribution for the statistic
was derived by treating each permuted data set as if it was the
“original” data, calculating p-values and cluster mass statistics in
the manner described above, and storing the maximum observed
statistic for each permutation. This allowed us to identify the onset
of the ﬁrst signiﬁcant cluster for both the main effect as well as for
the interaction.
To obtain conﬁdence limits, we repeated the complete analy-
sis described above for 999 bootstrapped versions of the data set,
wherein we sampled subjects with replacement from each group
at random. If for a given bootstrapped dataset, no signiﬁcant clus-
ter for the main effect or interaction was detected at α = 0.05,
the α level was progressively lowered until a cluster was detected,
stopping at α = 0.2. Although the conﬁdence limits derived from
bootstrapping provide useful information, the main inferential
focus is on the results of the cluster randomization on the original
data.
RESULTS
The time-course data appear in Figure 2. Note that 0 ms does
not correspond to the onset of the utterance (e.g., “move” in
“move the candle”), but to the onset of the referring expression
within the utterance (e.g., “candle”). Thus any differences in tim-
ing between groups cannot be attributed to possible linguistic
differences between Chinese and English in the duration of the
material preceding the referring expression.
The cluster randomization procedure detected signiﬁcant over-
all egocentric interference from 750 to 2800 ms, with the 95%
conﬁdence interval for the onset of interference ranging from 517
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FIGURE 2 |Time plots of eye-tracking data, showing (A) egocentric
interference (competitor minus non-competitor); (B) raw probabilities of
gazing at the competitor (higher red/blue lines) and non-competitor
(lower red/blue lines); and (C) time-course of egocentric interference
(main effect) against the cultural difference in interference (Culture-
by-Competition interaction). Observed data (points) and model predictions
(curves), with the colored bands surrounding each curve representing ±1 SE,
and the shaded bars representing 95% conﬁdence intervals for effect onsets.
The leftmost bar in each plot corresponds to onset of the competition effect,
while the rightmost bar reﬂects the onset of cultural effects.
to 917 ms (p1 < 0.001, p2 = 0.003)2. As Figure 2 clearly shows,
there was a large time-lag between the onset of egocentric interfer-
ence and the onset of a cultural difference in this interference (as
given by a Culture-by-Competition interaction). There was little
evidence that Chinese participants experienced any less interfer-
ence than U.S. participants until 1767 ms, approximately 1000 ms
after the onset of interference. The Culture-by-Competition
interaction was signiﬁcant from 1767 to 2483 ms (p1 = 0.009,
p2 = 0.049), with the 95% conﬁdence interval for the onset rang-
ing from 1383 to 2117 ms. Note that there was no overlap between
the conﬁdence interval for the onset of the cultural difference
(1383–2117) with that for the onset of egocentric interference
(517–917). Furthermore, we directly computed the delay between
the onsets for each bootstrapped sample, which yielded a 95%
conﬁdence interval for the lag between 600 and 1400 ms.
DISCUSSION
Overall, our ﬁndings support the hypothesis that language users
from different cultures share a common stratum of referential
processing, with cultural variation in how the products of these
early referential processes are used in the higher-level processes
governing thought and action. Speciﬁcally, whereas neither Chi-
nese norWestern participants were able to integrate the situational
cue of the speaker’s perspective into lexical processing, Chinese
participants were better able to suppress the interference.
Could our ﬁndings of common interference and differential
correction be alternatively explained in terms of linguistic differ-
ences between Mandarin Chinese and English? One potentially
2Although an onset of 750 ms is quite late relative to typical visual-world studies
(250–350 ms), this is not surprising given that our paradigm presented participants
with a more demanding search task than in a typical study. Whereas a typical
grid in Wu and Keysar (2007) contained nine alternatives appearing in any of 16
possible locations, a typical visual-world task presents nomore than four referential
alternatives in ﬁxed locations (Huettig et al., 2011).
relevant difference is that Mandarin lacks deﬁnite marking, such
that the Mandarin version of the English expression “move the
candle”might be glossed in English as “move candle.” It might be
argued that the Chinese participants were interpreting the descrip-
tions as if the speaker had said, “move any candle.” This would
indeed predict that the Chinese participants would experience less
interference than the U.S. participants because they would not
need to decide between the two possible referents, but could pick
either one. However, if thiswere the case, thenChinese participants
should have shown a stronger tendency than U.S. participants to
move the hidden candle, since any candle would sufﬁce. However,
the data showed the exact opposite. While the U.S. participants
sometimes moved the occluded candle, the Chinese participants
never did.
One possible concern might be that the later correction for
Chinese participants reﬂects shorter referring expressions in Chi-
nese, or more rapid speech when the confederate spoke Chinese.
Although we lack the data to directly address this question, the
overall patterns shown in Figure 2 make this explanation seem
unlikely. First, if the earlier correction occurred because the Chi-
nese expressions were briefer or spoken more rapidly, then not
only would the correction process take place earlier, but so would
the egocentric interference; speciﬁcally, the initial rising slope of
the curve should have been much steeper for the Chinese group
than for theWestern group, and should have reached its peakmuch
earlier. However, egocentric interference seems to rise at similar
rates for both groups, and both seem to initially reach their max-
imum values at roughly the same time (1000–1200 ms). Second,
whereas the correction process seems to begin at around 1000 ms
for the Chinese group, it seems delayed until about 2200ms for the
American group. This is far too great of a disparity to be explained
by differences in the spoken expressions, given that expressions in
these types of experiments typically last no more than 1 s. Finally,
the groups differ not only in the timing of the correction, but also
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in the efﬁcacy of the correction, with a sudden sharp decline for
the Chinese group, and more of a lingering pattern for the West-
ern group. Thus, these patterns seem less likely to be driven by
differences in the stimuli, and more likely to reﬂect true cultural
differences in linguistic interpretation.
Constraint-based views would have difﬁculty accounting for
the extreme delay in the emergence of cultural differences rela-
tive to the onset of egocentric interference. If, as constraint-based
views predict, language users can integrate perspective infor-
mation from the earliest moments of processing, and Chinese
participants attend more strongly to the shared perspective than
Westerners, then Chinese participants should have shown less
egocentric interference from the very earliest moments of pro-
cessing. Our view, then, is that despite attending more strongly
to shared information, Chinese participants are no better at inte-
grating it into referential processing. However, an alternative view
must be considered, which is that perhaps the late emergence does
not reﬂect a standalone correction process, but simply reﬂects
delayed activation of shared information relative to other kinds of
information. Under this view, had the shared knowledge become
activated earlier, perhaps we would have seen its effects earlier
in processing. However, it is unclear what would account for
the delayed activation of shared knowledge within the current
paradigm. For one, in the current experimental situation, lis-
teners knew well before hearing the referring expression which
items their partner could see and which they could not see. In
other words, information about what was shared was available
to participants even before any referential information became
available. It is therefore not clear why listeners would wait for
a referring expression to activate the shared knowledge, rather
than using it to predict potential referents in advance. It is not
possible to tell whether listeners in fact made such predictions,
because this requires comparing shared to privileged objects, and
our analysis only considered privileged objects. However, exper-
iments using a similar setup have found that in the interval
preceding the onset of the referring expression, listeners are more
likely to look at shared objects (Keysar et al., 2000). Furthermore,
recent experiments including conditions where competitors/non-
competitors are shared show that listeners spontaneously access
shared knowledge prior to the onset of referring expressions, but
are unable to integrate this information into early referential pro-
cesses (Barr, 2008). Speciﬁcally, listeners attend less overall to
privileged objects than to shared objects, but nonetheless expe-
rience similar levels of interference from competitors regardless of
whether they are shared or not. It would be of interest to repeat
these experiments with East Asian participants. Our account pre-
dicts greater access to shared knowledge among East Asians, but
without any reduction in the size of the interference produced by
competitors.
Our view that information about perspective is involved in
correction is consistent with an anchoring and adjustment view of
perspective taking (Keysar et al., 2000), in which listeners anchor
interpretation in their own perspectives, and use information
about the speaker’s perspective to incrementally adjust away from
the anchor. However, distinct from Keysar et al.’s (2000) origi-
nal formulation, our ﬁndings, together with those of Barr (2008),
suggest that listeners do not strategically “anchor” in their own
egocentric perspective as a kind of reasoning heuristic; rather, their
anchoring is forced upon them by the autonomous activation of
referents by low-level interpretation processes that are blind to
information about the speaker’s perspective (Barr, 2008). Under
this view, the noted egocentrism of listeners might be best char-
acterized as a form of “mental contamination” – i.e., the result of
rapid, automatic processes that are beyond control and possibly
even awareness (Wilson and Brekke, 1994).
Consistent with the use of common ground in correction,
other research shows that perspective taking involves cognitive
effort (Rossnagel, 2000; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Nilsen and Gra-
ham, 2009; Lin et al., 2010), and recent neuroimaging evidence
suggests a role for the medial pre-frontal cortex in the adjustment
process (Tamir and Mitchell, 2010). Furthermore, the correction
account is also consistent with dual process views of perspective
taking, which assume that social judgments reﬂect the combina-
tion of both efﬁcient but inﬂexible processing that uses limited
information and more ﬂexible but effortful processing that can
draw upon a broader set of information (Apperly and Butterﬁll,
2009). However, the current data offer no insight into why the
adjustment process might differ across the groups. One possi-
bility, consistent with the collectivist vs. individualist distinction,
is that information about a speaker’s perspective is simply more
available to people from a collectivist background, since their
cultures require greater attunement to one anothers’ knowledge.
Another is that perhaps Chinese participants are more motivated
to perform the task “correctly” due to heightened concerns about
self-presentation. A further possibility is that membership in a
Chinese culture, where self-control is valued, results in better exec-
utive control abilities. This explanation is supported by research
that ﬁnds enhanced executive control abilities among Chinese as
opposed to North American children (Sabbagh et al., 2006), who
nonetheless showed comparable performance on a belief reason-
ing task. As we have argued here and elsewhere (Keysar et al., 2003;
Barr, 2008) listeners’ difﬁculty in identifying the intended refer-
ent in conversational perspective-taking tasks is unlikely to be the
result of a failure to have the appropriate beliefs about what is
shared with the speaker. Instead, it seems to reﬂect difﬁculty using
this information to constrain the processing of the linguistic input.
To the extent that early referential processes are not guided by
beliefs about the speaker, these processes will boost activation of
referents that are pragmatically implausible, even in spite of cor-
rect and accessible representations of shared knowledge. Because
suppressing this knowledge will involve executive control, it is
here where we would expect to see strong individual (and cul-
tural) differences. Although in this respect our view is consistent
with Sabbagh et al.’s (2006) developmental ﬁndings, it is impor-
tant to note that it is not yet known whether the differences in
executive function that Sabbagh et al. (2006) noted extend into
adulthood.
Whatever the explanation for the cultural differences, a recent
study suggests that it might be possible to induce cultural effects
through priming. Luk et al. (2012) replicated Wu and Keysar’s
(2007) study but with Chinese-Westerner bi-cultural individuals.
Participants primed by images from Western culture committed
more egocentric errors on the perspective-taking task relative to
participants who were primed by images from Chinese culture.
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The fact that cultural differences can be situationally induced in
bicultural individuals suggests that they arise from ﬂexible modes
of processing. This ﬂexibility is consistent with our explanation
of such differences in terms of differential correction – it would
seem easier to override a deliberative and effortful correction pro-
cess than an integration process that is largely routinized and
automatic.
In sum, our data suggest that people from different cultures
share a common core of ambiguity resolution processes, but differ
in how the output from these processes is linked to higher-level
systems governing thought and action. The two cultures we have
studied show systematic differences in how they prioritize the indi-
vidual vs. the social (Triandis et al., 1988; Markus and Kitayama,
1991; Ross et al., 2002). Finding equivalent interference from priv-
ileged information in spite of such differences suggests that such
egocentrismmight be a universal consequence of rapid ambiguity
resolution during spoken language comprehension.
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